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The Return of China, Post-Cold War Russia, 
and the Arctic: Changes on Land and at Sea 
Abstract:  
With a long view of the Arctic in international politics and economics, the paper discusses the effects of political 
and economic power transitions for the Arctic, focusing on Sino-Russian relations. The Arctic has in the last 
decade received new attention from new quarters of the world, especially Asian emerging powers, which 
reflects climate change and power transition/globalization. The focus here is on cases of cross-border 
exchanges in agriculture, raw materials, processed goods, energy and Arctic shipping. The chapter discusses 
how Sino-Russian relations in this region reflect general trends of Russia and China in a post-Cold War 
globalized international political and economic system. Russia for both domestic and international reasons 
struggles to find its post-Cold War position in the international political and economic system, which affects its 
place between the West and China. Russia's entire northern boundary is the Arctic, with the longest Arctic 
coastline of all five Arctic coastal states. To in any way relegate any parts of its Arctic marine area currently 
defined by the Law of Sea as its EEZ to any international or Chinese authority would diminish Russia’s power. 
China has since the late 1970s experienced phenomenal economic growth, which is the strongest single driver 
of political and economic power transition in the international system. This power transition also defines 
China’s relation to the Arctic and to Russia. China now terms itself a "near Arctic" nation, has previously 
described the Arctic as a common heritage of mankind, and seeks to further its influence in the Arctic.  
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Highlights 
1) The Arctic is historically embedded in the international system 
2) End of Cold War and Rise of China greatly Arctic today 
3) Pacific Arctic is little known to Nordic and North Atlantic observers 
4) Sino-Russian relations in Pacific Arctic reflect global geopolitics 
5) Russia is distrustful of Chinese natural resource investment 
1. Introduction 
The Arctic has received new outside attention for about a decade. Much of this attention - especially popular, 
but also academic - has focused on local factors in the Arctic. The focus has often been on energy, minerals and 
shipping lanes made accessible by climate change (Borgerson 2008). There has been a lack of attention to the 
wider forces of globalization driving this attention to the Arctic. Therefore, the popular and academic 
discussion of the Arctic benefits from showing the place of the Arctic in the international system before, now 
and in the future. For the last 25+ years, those systemic changes are the end of the Cold War followed by 
globalization. The chapter discusses the effects of these international political and economic systemic shifts for 
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the Arctic with focus on China and Russia based on a foundation of how the international systemic changes 
affect Russia and China: the end of the Cold War and globalization/power transition.  
 
Before turning to the recent international changes of the end of the Cold War and globalization, it is valuable 
to remember that the North American, North Atlantic and Eurasian Arctic has been economic, military and 
scientific theatres for European and Western powers since medieval times. For instance, North Atlantic fish fed 
medieval Europe during Lent. The Royal Navy and the German Kriegsmarine fought each other for primacy of 
the North Atlantic and Barents Seas in two world wars. During the Cold War, US and Soviet submarine-based 
strategic nuclear weapons systems and anti-subware warfighting systems were heavily deployed there  
(Heininen, Southcott 2010). 
2. China, Globalization and the Arctic 
China’s and Asia’s new interest in the Arctic is driven by forces outside the Arctic and not local factors: 
environmental and political-economic globalization. Environmental globalization is primarily climate change 
here, which is particularly pronounced in the Arctic (and Antarctic). The rising Asian economic and political 
powers are vulnerable to climate change, such as sea-level rise threatening major economic and population 
centers along the coast of China. They have scientific ambitions matching their economic and political rise, and 
therefore also climate scientific ambitions, where Polar areas are central areas of research (Li, Bertelsen 2013).  
 
The other driving factor in the interest of rising Asian powers in the Arctic is political and economic globalization 
and the international politics concept of “power transition”, which describes the changing relative power of 
rising and declining great powers. Such power transition is one of the most influential aspects of international 
history, very hard to manage peacefully, and has often resulted in devastating wars as the Napoleonic Wars or 
the two world wars. Popular and academic audiences must remember that power transition has affected the 
Arctic historically and political-economic globalization does so today to great extent (Heininen, Southcott 
2010). 
 
Especially China’s phenomenal growth is tilting the international political and economic system also with 
effects on the Arctic and Sino-Russian relations. Since instituting its Open Door policy in the late 1970s, China 
has experienced historically unprecedented economic growth of around 10% per year, which has returned it 
to its historical place in the world economy. It is correct to emphasize the “return” of China in the world 
economy in light of China and Asia’s historical relative place in the world economy. This economic growth has 
brought China from being a poor developing country based on agriculture and a 1/20th of the US economy to 
being at par with the US economy in terms of purchasing power parity. The other Asian Arctic Council observer 
states, India, Japan, Singapore and South Korea have also grown markedly in recent years and decades 
spearheaded by Japan in the after-war years (Li, Bertelsen 2013). 
China has high ambitions in science, technology, research, development and innovation for international and 
domestic reasons. Ambitions in, for instance, space or Polar science show China as a great power. China is 
forced to transition its economy from an investment- and factor-input-driven growth model to an innovation- 
and consumption-driven growth model. Both drives a great expansion of research and education in China  
(Lundvall et al. 2009, Schwaag Serger 2009, Xie, Zhang & Lai 2014, Cao, Suttmeier & Simon 2009, Schaaper 
2009, Xu 2008, Huang, Gouveia & Varum 2007). The interconnections between Arctic climate science and 
Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen & Vincent Gallucci. Marine Policy. 2016 
3 
3 
Chinese climate is presented as an argument for China as a legitimate participant in Arctic governance. This is 
supportive of the often heard argument that the "Arctic is a "global commons" which no small group of nations 
can govern. And is further supported by the argument that China is a "near Arctic" country. China argues based 
on (Arctic) climate science that it is affected by (Arctic) climate change to legitimize a role for in Arctic 
governance. Climate change is feared to affect Chinese agriculture and thereby food security and social 
stability. Teleconnections between Arctic climate and Chinese climate is presented as an argument for China 
as a legitimate participant in Arctic governance. The Chinese population and especially economy is 
overwhelmingly concentrated along the low coastline of China, so sea level rise threatens key economic and 
population centers in China (Li, Bertelsen 2013). 
 
Political and economic globalization also explain China’s interest in the Arctic. Here it is important to see the 
Arctic in a global context and not mistakenly believe that China has a particular interest in the Arctic compared 
to other regions of the world. There has in some Arctic popular and research circles been a tendency to see the 
Arctic as high priority for China. Such a view is naturally based on dissociating China’s Arctic interest from the 
general development of China’s place in the international system. A remark at the Aalborg University workshop 
on “The Arctic Nexus in Asian-Nordic+ Relations” 5-7 November 2013 by Dr SU Ping of Tongji University is 
illustrative: “when I am in Arctic conferences, lots of people talk about China, when I am in China, only a few 
people talk about the Arctic.” This remark by Dr SU was surprising to some of the Arctic participants in the 
workshop. They had difficulty seeing what would be an enormous engagement in a small Arctic community as 
negligible in a Chinese context. To understand China’s interest in the Arctic among its myriad other domestic 
and international interests, it is useful to look at what the Chinese Communist Party defines as its core interests 
and the political guiding principle of President XI Jinping of the “Chinese Dream”.  
 
A core interest of the Chinese Communist Party is political stability and the continued rule by the Party. To 
achieve this goal, continuous economic growth must be ensured. The investment- and production factor-driven 
growth of China so far has required enormous inputs of energy and raw materials. This input has made China 
the predominant importer of energy and raw materials, which has dictated international energy and 
commodities markets driving up prices and feeding the economic boom of many commodities producing 
countries around the world. China has and continues to source energy and raw materials from around the 
world - which is clear from, for instance, its controversial energy, mining and other commodities producing 
investments in Africa, Latin America and further. This global sourcing of energy and raw materials for fueling 
continuous Chinese economic growth is the necessary framework to understand China’s interest in Arctic 
energy and raw materials. The Arctic is one possible source among many others, it is particularly 
environmentally and technically challenging, but it is composed by strong, stable states providing political 
stability unlike many other source regions. Despite the export driven nature of the Chinese economy the key 
to its success is the import driven nature of fuel for its industry. Without Arctic-sourced imported fuel, its other 
sources support extremely long supply lines, which is perilous. Direct access to industrial fuel from the Arctic, 
the Russian or its own (which at present it does not have) provides assurance of a stable future. Of course, the 
same is true for the other Asian countries  (Li, Bertelsen 2013, Bertelsen, Li & Gregersen 2016). 
 
Another aspect of the domestic political necessity of continued high economic growth is trade. Chinese 
economic growth has been export-driven with overwhelmingly sea-based trade. China is therefore putting 
much strategic emphasis in developing its global trade-avenues. This is most clear in the “One Belt, One Road” 
policy of developing both the tradition Malacca Strait and Suez Canal connection to the Indian Ocean and 
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Europe and the overland connection through Central Asia to the Middle East and Europe. Possible new Arctic 
sea lanes along the Northern Sea Route north of Russia (historically known in the West as the Northeast 
Passage), the Northwest Passage north of Alaska and Canada, or a Transpolar route are therefore the marginal 
alternatives that a great power can afford to entertain as strategic hedging and experimenting. Overall it is 
clear that China has a deep strategic interest in security of supply of energy, raw materials and sea-lanes, which 
is the framework for its Arctic interest. President XI Jinping has declared the “Chinese Dream” to be the guiding 
vision of his policy. It is a dream of both domestic prosperity and international recognition of great power 
status. The Arctic as a source region of energy and raw materials therefore supports the dream of domestic 
prosperity, as explained above, and participation in Arctic governance - as in global and regional governance 
around the world - supports the external dream of international recognition (Li, Bertelsen 2013, Bertelsen, Li 
& Gregersen 2016). 
3. Post-Cold War Russia in the Arctic 
The long aftermath of the Cold War in the international system has been overshadowed by the power transition 
driven by the rise of China. This long aftermath of the Cold War has forcefully surfaced in the shape of the 
Ukraine crisis, which plays a key role for the Arctic today and Sino-Russian relations in the region.  
 
The historical international system context for the current Arctic situation under the Ukraine crisis deserves to 
be outlined to remind of the systemic embeddedness of the Arctic. Russia as the successor state of the USSR 
went through politically, economically and socially tumultuous times during President Boris Yeltsin’s rule in the 
1990s. Russia’s international status was much diminished. It lost its sphere of influence in Eastern and Central 
Europe, which was integrated into the West with NATO- and EU-membership. Russia lost the overseas 
influence of the USSR in many developing countries. The domestic affairs of Russia were significantly stabilized 
since Vladimir Putin replaced Yeltsin as president in 1999. The above mentioned boom in energy and 
commodity prices driven by Chinese and emerging market growth stimulated the Russian public and private 
economy greatly. However, Russia has continued to be marked by struggle over its post-USSR place in the 
international system and over the nature of its domestic political and economic system.  
 
Soviet/Russian political, economic and military dominance over Central and Eastern Europe unravelled with 
the fall of communist regimes in these countries in the autumn of 1989. In the years and decades following, 
Russia lost this previous sphere of influence as many of these countries joined the EU and NATO against the 
will of Russia, which Russia could not force upon these countries and the West. However, with the NATO 
Bucharest declaration of 2007 inviting Georgia and Ukraine to become NATO-members, the West had 
overextended itself into a Russian sphere of influence. The brief 2008 Russian-Georgian war put an effective 
end to Georgia’s NATO ambitions.  
The EU has strategically used its “Neighborhood Policy” to attempt to surround itself with liberal democracies 
and well-functioning market economies to the South and East. This strategy has generally been successful to 
the east. The EU and Ukraine negotiated a partnership to be signed in the autumn of 2013. However, then 
President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych withdrew from the planned partnership and turned politically and 
economically towards Russia. This decision led to widespread protests in Kiev, the Euro-Maidan protests, in 
late 2013 and early 2014. When the Ukrainian government used excessive and deadly force against the 
protesters, it lead to the ultimate ouster of President Yanukovych. Russia saw its economic, political and 
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military interests in Ukraine in free fall with the fall of Yanukovych and responded with more or less covert 
interventions in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Russia’s annexation of Crimea is an unprecedented change of 
borders by force in post World War II European politics. The intervention in Eastern Ukraine has created one 
of the frozen conflicts (as in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova) which Russia 
has used to try to secure a sphere of influence while forced to retreat from Eastern Europe and the Caucasus 
(Mearsheimer 2014).  
Especially the annexation of Crimea was an unacceptable challenge to Western interests in terms of 
international norms and rules and caused widespread fears in the West for Russian challenges to the NATO 
countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The USA and Europe responded to Russian action with a range of 
economic and technological sanctions against Russian Arctic offshore oil and gas development cutting it off 
from financing and technology. In the framework of this Russian-Western conflict, Russia has been forced to 
consider strategic alternatives, where the Sino-Russian relationship looms large. Europe is a big customer of 
Russian Arctic oil and gas. The Ukraine conflict brought much stronger urgency and attention to the question 
of Europe’s import of Russian gas and the importance of European energy security and diversifying energy 
supplies away from overdependency on Russia.  
4. Rising China, Post-Cold War Russia and the Arctic  
The confluence of the end of the Cold War and globalization driven by the rise of China are clear in the Arctic, 
both on land and at sea.1 This paper discusses the Russian Far East and the Bering region concerning the cases 
of cross-border exchange, trade and investment in agriculture, commodities and processed goods, oil and gas 
trade and investment, and Arctic shipping. This discussion will demonstrate potentially particularly dramatic 
effects of these twin international developments for the Pacific Arctic, more dramatic than in other parts of 
the Arctic.  
 
Russia (and the USSR) combined historically and today being state and empire at the same time. Russia has an 
enormous sparsely populated territory with no natural borders. These borders have ebbed and flowed 
historically. Unlike China, Russia has usually bordered higher developed centers of power than itself. Therefore 
the periphery has been more important than the center for Russia (unlike China). With these porous borders 
and powerful neighbors, Russia has always thought geostrategically in terms of time and space. Space could 
be sacrificed to an invader in exchange of time to turn the time as with Napoleon or Nazi Germany. Therefore 
maximizing imperial space in all directions is a Russian geostrategic instinct, which is also at play in its Far East 
with historically fluid borders and a very powerful and rising China (Cheng 2011). 
The setting is a resurgent China with a population of 1.3+ billion people and a dynamic and increasingly 
innovative and entrepreneurial economy sourcing energy and raw materials globally. Russia has a bit more 
than a tenth of China’s population and an economy dominated by the energy and raw materials of its enormous 
territory. Looking at the Russian Far East, a Russian population of 6 millions borders dynamic Chinese regions 
of 90 million inhabitants. Chinese - and other Asian - economic engagement becomes more and more 
important in Russian Far Eastern cities. Political-historically, Russian control of some of these border regions 
                                                           
1 The USA is naturally a very present force in this region, and one can revisit the notion of the “romantic triangle” of 
the USA, the People’s Republic of China and the USSR from the Cold War, where the USA held the pivotal position 
(Wishnick 2015). 
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only stretches back into the 1800s and clash with historical Chinese claims to these regions. In fact, Russia's 
relative weakness in the Pacific was crystallized by the disastrous Russo-Japanese war of  1904-1905. Russia 
lost her only Pacific warm-water port, most of her Pacific - and Baltic - fleet. History is tending to repeat itself 
a little over a century later with Russia’s relative loss of power with the end of the Cold War and China’s 
resurgence, which comes together forcefully in this region with potentially dramatic effects for Russia. It is 
worth noting that as recently as the turn of the 20th Century wars have been fought to define the present 
boundaries of China (and Manchuria), Japan and Korea. In fact for at least two of the Pacific Kuril Islands World 
War II continues without a Peace treaty. Since this island chain extends as far north as the Russian Kamchatka 
peninsula, it’s possible strategic importance is unknowable. There is also a present Sino-Russian disagreement 
that goes back to the 1990s when most of the demarcation was settled between Russia and China along the 
Amur River except for two islands in the river. The islands are close to the major Siberian city of Khabarovsk of 
strategic importance to Russia.  
 
This discussion of the Pacific Arctic and the Sino-Russian relationship is particularly valuable for Nordic and 
North Atlantic Arctic researchers and observers, for whom the Pacific Arctic is distant geographically and 
mentally. In the Nordic and North-Atlantic Arctic there is a sentiment that China and Northeast Asia is far 
removed from the (Nordic and North Atlantic) Arctic. There is less realization, that there are vast Arctic marine 
and terrestrial areas in the Russian Far East and the Bering region, that are geographically close to Northeast 
Asia and notably Northeastern provinces of China. Above it was outlined how globalization drives Chinese and 
other Asian attention to the Arctic, where sourcing of energy and raw materials and access to new shipping-
lanes are important. Here there has been a tendency in North Atlantic and Nordic Arctic research and public 
debate to focus on possible Chinese investments in Iceland or Greenland, which has raised suspicions and 
domestic political controversies, or the business potentials of trans-Arctic shipping for areas of Northern 
Fennoscandia and Iceland (Breum, Chemnitz 2013, Utanríkisráðuneytið 2005, Anonymous2010, Lanteigne 
2010, Lanteigne 2008, Underhill 2010, Utanríkisráðuneytið 2007). There has been little attention to Sino-
Russian relations concerning energy and raw materials in the enormous Russian Arctic or the Bering end of 
trans-Arctic shipping routes, which involves the USA, Japan, and South Korea. 
4.1 Sino-Russian Cross-Border Trade and Interactions 
Looking at Russian and Chinese border cities along the Amur River, such as Blagoveshchensk on the Russian 
bank of the Amur River and Heihe on the Chinese side, illustrates the demographic and economic imbalances 
with large Chinese populations in growing cities with high rises and production bordering much smaller and 
less dynamic Russian cities. And this is a region of Russia which was only claimed for Russian about 150 years 
ago at the time when European colonial powers were encroaching in China from all sides - which the People’s 
Republic of China has been determined to correct.  
 
Cross-border collaboration along China’s and Russia’s 4,000 km long common border is a high priority for the 
central governments of both states, but this collaboration has far from reached the anticipated level. The 
reasons for the unfulfilled promises of this collaboration are illustrative for our discussion of larger 
international political and economic systemic effects here. The high-level attention to cross-border 
collaboration is clear from the Program of Cooperation between the Northeast of the People’s Republic of China 
and the Far East and Eastern Siberia of the Russian Federation (2009-2018), which was signed by Chinese and 
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Russian leaders during the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September 2009. This Program has 
subsequently been mentioned following bilateral meetings of Chinese and Russian premiers and presidents 
(Cheng 2015). 
 
Despite this high-level commitment, Cheng (2015) shows based on fieldwork that of the 339 projects outlined 
by the Program to create a transnational corridor and facilities for energy processing only 13.3% were 
compleeted, 19.5% were partly completed and 67.3% were uncompleted. This state of affairs in particular 
raises concerns on the Russian side. The trade pattern between the two sides is clear with Russia exporting 
commodities and energy to China, which in turn exports processed goods. Therefore, Japan and South Korea 
are also in fact the most important trading partners of two of the Northeastern Chinese regions, Liaoning and 
Jilin, rather than Russia. As outlined above, China has an almost insatiable demand for energy and raw materials 
to feed it rapidly growing and in absolute terms enormous economy. It is therefore natural, that China will be 
very interested in sourcing raw materials from the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia. There are large 
potentials for developing raw materials extraction and agricultural production in the Russian Far East and 
Eastern Siberia of great interest to Chinese buyers. Russia overall lacks capital for this development and 
workforce in the region to carry out this development. China has plenty of both capital and workforce. 
However, Chinese investment and labor engagement in Russian raw materials extraction and agriculture is 
severely hampered by Russian distrust and fear of losing control over these raw materials and lands to Chinese 
investment and population. Older Russians still remember Chinese claims to previous Chinese lands during the 
Sino-Soviet split (although settled in the 1990s). Cheng references widespread Russian elite and student fears 
of Chinese designs on the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia. 
 
Agriculture is a valuable case to consider in greater depth for these cross-border relations. China is deeply 
preoccupied with food security for its enormous population, and agriculture is one of the very most important 
policy areas for its leadership. This concern with food security has led to very intense farming in China including 
extensive use of fertilizer, which is threatening the environment and the quality of food (food safety). Chinese 
agriculture is also causing a national water crisis. Intensive Chinese farming has also led to well-developed 
Chinese agricultural technology. Northeast China is one of the main agricultural regions of China of key 
importance to Chinese food security and holding much agricultural capital and expertise. The Russian Far East 
and Eastern Siberia has sizeable arable lands (although limited by, for instance, indigenous reindeer pasturing). 
However, much of this land is not cultivated because of the low and declining population of the region. 
Therefore there are none of the environmental and food safety problems on the Russian side. Russia has tried 
to increase the cultivation of these lands offering free land to new settlers. However, this policy has not been 
successful stemming or reversing the outflow of population to western parts of Russia. There is therefore 
apparently potential for agriculture in the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia supplying high quality food to 
Chinese consumers. However, again such potential is severely hampered by Russian opposition to Chinese 
investment and labor import for fear of land-grabbing and loss of control of land (Xiao 2015). 
Russian apprehensions about Chinese investments in raw materials and presence of Chinese laborers probably 
reflect the centuries old characteristic of Russian (and Soviet) economy of “power property rights”, which 
reflect Russian socio-economic historical development since Ivan III in the late 1400s. A fundamental economic 
difference between Russia and the West is in terms of property rights. In the West, property rights were distinct 
from political power allowing private entrepreneurship to develop. The Tsar, the USSR and now President Putin 
has never allowed such a distinction, where political power has always appropriated property rights and 
collected rents, usually of natural resources (Cheng 2013). This institutional setup both reflects Russia as a 
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natural resource-based economy and keeps Russia as such. This historical difficulty separating political 
sovereignty and private property rights is perhaps also part of the problem of Russia to allow Chinese 
investment and labor in natural resource extraction and agriculture. 
4.2 Sino-Russian Gas Agreements in the Shadow of the Ukraine Crisis 
Above it was outlined how mismanaged Russian-West post-Cold War geopolitical competition in the Caucasus 
and Eastern Europe escalated into the Ukraine crisis and how this crisis cut Russia off from Western finance 
and technology for its future Arctic offshore oil and gas basis and put Russia’s energy trade with Europe into 
question. Russia had to respond by showing that it had alternative options to Europe, and that alternative was 
China. Therefore Russia and China concluded two large gas-sales agreements in 2014, which had been under 
negotiation. However, the advantageous terms of the agreement for China suggests the lack of options for 
Russia and therefore bargaining power of China - which illustrates well the combination of the end of the Cold 
War weakening of Russia and the rise of China (O'Sullivan 2014). 
 
Another example of this Sino-Russian Arctic energy relationship is concerning the large Yamal Liquified Natural 
Gas (LNG) project. The Yamal Peninsula juts out from Siberia into the Arctic Ocean. One side of the peninsula 
bounds the Kara Sea. This LNG project is in the early stages so costs and production are preliminary and 
definitely influenced by the sanctions placed on Russia. However, striking a balance using historical data, 
estimated cost of the project is 27 billion USD to full production in 2025 and interim production in 2017. Despite 
the sanctions placed upon Yamal's majority stakeholder, the private Russian gas company Novatek, production 
has slowed but not stopped. The 27 billion USD investment project is 50.1% owned by Novatek, 20% owned by 
Total, 20% by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNCP) and 9.9% by China’s Silk Road Fund, which ties this 
project to the One Belt, One Road policy. The objective is to tap into Northwest Siberia's extensive natural gas 
reserves, which are estimated to contain 84% of Russia's total natural gas. Ultimately, Yamal will export 16.5 
million tons of LNG a year. The funding for this project is global, Russia, France, China. In addition, the 
infrastructure of pipelines, etc., is internationally funded as well. Extending these relations further, China and 
Russia have been haggling for 20 years, but did finally sign a $700 billion agreement for gas deliveries, which is 
about 17% of Beijing's annual consumption, under the shadow of the Ukraine crisis as mentioned above (TASS 
Russian News Agency 2016, Reuters 2016). 
4.3 Arctic Shipping and the Bering Sea Region 
Turning to the seascape of the Bering region, any vessel from the Atlantic Arctic leaves the Arctic Ocean into 
the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas and proceeds to the Bering Strait separating the Chukotka Peninsula from Alaska 
and into the Bering Sea. Some of this transit is potentially perilous for the vessel especially through the Bering 
Strait, especially in ice-choked winter months. This strait is about 85 km wide and 30-50 m deep. It contains 
rock outcroppings and two small islands, Big and Little Diomede. The extremely limited maneuverability of 
large container and oil tanker vessels is a further concern. After entering the Bering Sea the vessels have some 
options to move themselves from winter high seas and gales. One of these is to use the islands of the Aleutian 
Island chain beginning approximately in the two Pribilof Islands and extending into Russian waters at the 
Commandorski Islands. The point here is that these islands, and the waters of the Bering Strait, are owned by 
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both Russia and the U.S. Of course, vessels leaving any of the Russian or Asian countries ports must travel this 
route in reverse.  
 
Another point is that vessel passage from beginning to end, from European Arctic to Asian Arctic, is adjacent 
to a significant land mass, owned and administered from Moscow. This has demographic consequences as 
Russia constantly battles outmigration everywhere from Siberia southward to China's northern border. As one 
proceeds southerly past Vladivostok the climate moderates and the fertility of the land increases. With a 
decreasing Russian population Chinese are attracted northward. Even the goods manufactured and the 
produce grown have a tendency to travel southward exacerbating local tensions.  
 
How these dynamic demographic circumstances combined with climate change will affect the future remains 
to be seen. Indeed, it possible to hypothesize that in the future that same vessel will not turn southward but 
rather will find an (as yet unbuilt) deep water port in Chukotka connected to a (as yet unbuilt) railroad terminal 
running southward. As can be seen, the future of the two potential passages across the Arctic Ocean to realize 
their potential rests on much that lies outside of the Arctic.       
5. The Pacific Arctic and the Circumpolar Arctic under 
Globalization: China in the Arctic Council 
The dependence of Russia on China driven both by Russia’s post-Cold War international position and 
globalization with the return of China suggests both an increased reliance of Russia on China and role for China 
in the Arctic. The logic of the “Chinese Dream” of both domestic prosperity and international recognition will 
push for China being increasingly involved in Russian energy and raw material extraction in Russia and the 
Russian Far East. It will also increase the role of China in Arctic Ocean maritime affairs and governance, and 
consequently in Circumpolar Arctic governance. As China becomes a larger economic and political force in the 
world - although growing slower than before - it is likely to request a larger role in regional governance around 
the world (Mearsheimer 2001), including the Arctic. In May 2013, the Arctic states chose to solve the 
fundamental policy question of power transition whether to contain or integrate rising powers by integrating 
the rising powers in a junior position as observers while demanding their acquiesce to the institutions of the 
status quo powers (the sovereignty of Arctic states).  
 
It remains to be seen whether China - as any rising power - in the long run will abide by such a policy by the 
status quo powers, or demand a greater say in Circumpolar Arctic governance. The Sino-Russian(-American) 
relationship in the Pacific Arctic will be central to this question. Russia may either be dependent on China for 
the twin reasons outlined here, or seek to stem Chinese influence in the Arctic (for the same reasons), which 
will be exceedingly difficult (again for the same twin reasons). The role of the USA as the third major player in 
the Pacific Arctic and the superpower of the international system will be central. 




The place of the Arctic in the international political and economic system is a central question for 
understanding the history, present and future of the Arctic. The Arctic has historically been economically 
integrated into Southern economies, and it has been a major theatre of military operations in geopolitical 
competition between great and super powers during World War Two and the Cold War. Today, the Arctic is 
much shaped by the twin international political and economic systemic changes of post-Cold War Russia-West 
relations and globalization driven by the return of China to its historical place in the world economy. For Arctic 
research in the West, especially Nordic and North-Atlantic, the Pacific Arctic is a far away region of which 
people know little, and China - and other Asian observer states in the Arctic Council - are assumed to be far 
from the Arctic. There is less analysis or discussion of the repercussions of these international political and 
economic systemic developments for the Pacific Arctic and through that region on the Circumpolar Arctic. This 
article has sought to analyze and discuss such repercussions. The two co-authors represent the Nordic and 
North Atlantic Arctic in Tromsø and the Pacific (Arctic) in Seattle. 
 
Our finding is that Russian-Western conflicts driven by mismanaged post-Cold War geopolitical competition 
separate Russia from the West for technology, finance and markets for developing its Arctic energy and raw 
material resources. This separation forces Russia to turn to alternative sources of technology, finance and 
markets for its energy and natural resources, which most prominently is China. Russia is comparatively 
weakened compared to China in this relationship, which was illustrated by the terms of the 2014 Sino-Russian 
gas-sales-agreements. These post-Cold War dynamics are reinforced by globalization dominated by the 
phenomenal Chinese economic growth returning China to its historical position in the world economy. To fuel 
this growth, China has and will continue to source energy and raw materials globally, including in the Arctic. 
Here Russia is a treasure trove of energy and raw materials. And the Russian Far East is a vast region with a 
small population of around 6 mio people, while the bordering region in China has a population of 90 mio. 
Chinese economic engagement in the Russian Far East and migration is met by deep Russian distrust. 
Historically it is a contested region, where Russian imperial control was formalized in the mid-1800s during the 
time of Western colonial domination of China, which the People’s Republic of China has strived to correct. The 
Pacific Arctic is therefore the region where the combined consequences of the end of the Cold War and 
globalization may lead to dramatic shifts in political and economic power and demographics.  
 
The enormous land territory of the Russian Far East is one aspect, the other is the sea-space of the Bering 
Region. Attention has been devoted to analysing and discussing possible new Arctic sea lanes, where most 
attention has been focused on ice conditions in the Arctic Ocean. In the North Atlantic and Nordic Arctic, there 
continues to be much focus on possible regional development possibilities stemming from trans Arctic 
shipping. Less attention has been devoted to the Bering region entrance to these possible new shipping lanes. 
The Bering Strait is a bottleneck of shallow depth posing navigational problems, which reinforces the 
importance of ports and possible rail connections in Russian Far East. 
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